6 January 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT

Meeting with the Director of Personnel and Deputy Director, Security, on the Summer Intern Program for China Area

Specialists

gram for China area specialists which passed through your office in December was "flagged" by Colonel White and called to the attention of the Director of Security and the Director of Personnel for further consideration. Colonel White and Mr. Osborn both were concerned with the security considerations inherent in a program which would bring a number of young men into the Agency with full clearances and "the run of the place" for a summer vacation and then return them to their various university campuses without any assurance that we would ever see them again or continuing control over them. The question was posed, "how are you going to control these

	A meeting was called in the office of Mr. Director of Personnel, for 2:30 on Friday, Jan- to discuss this question. Present were Mr. Deputy Director of Security,	25X1 25X1
and myse	of the Office of Security,	

3. We all agreed readily that no one could guarantee against some unfortunate after-effect of having summer interns in the Agency who were given full clearances. We all quickly agreed that there was no "control" that could feasibly be exercised for these interns after their departure, and there certainly was no assurance that they would return to the Agency for careers. We discussed the various elements of the problem for thirty or forty minutes then reached the following conclusions:

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- a. Having a "program" of summer internships for China area specialists gave the impression of being too sweeping and continuing a concept. We agreed that the memorandum would be redrafted to request approval "in principle" for summer internships. Each intern recruited, interviewed, and processed then would be considered individually, and his "access" and general duties and responsibilities defined in as specific terms as possible. This, it seems to me, is a change in form rather than substance, but there seemed general agreement that the Chief of Security and the Executive Director be more likely to approve it.
- We also agreed that the Executive Director would be assured that special care would be taken in the selection of interns from the point of view of their maturity and sense of responsibility. so, each of them would receive special briefings upon entry on duty and special debriefings at the end of the summer on the responsibilities devolving upon them. And, it was also agreed that the Office of Security would provide for them contact persons to call upon in case of any questions or difficulties relating to security which might arise after they have returned to their universities. This supplemental memorandum is also to stress the special This suprelationship which ought to obtain between the intern and his supervisor, not only while he is on duty in the Agency but also after he has returned to his university.
- seemed to feel quite strongly that the inclusion of ONE among those offices who would have an intern complicated the problems of getting approval. He felt that both the Director of Security and the Executive Director were concerned at the "political sensitivity" which might result from an intern in ONE and by the very broad spectrum of information the intern would have access to as a member of the ONE Staff. I tried to discourage this approach but was not successful. By "political sensitivity", apparently was referring to the "glamour" of the Office or National Estimates, was referring to and the difficulty a young man might have in restraining himself on his return to his university from talking about his summer helping write National Intelligence Estimates.

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4. Mr. Echols and forces to do the redrafting.	are to combine 25X1
Coordinate	or for Academic Relations , China Task Force
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